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David Cameron is applying lessons from his party’s history in
the Conservatives’ ‘Euro War’
by Blog Admin
This week sees the annual Conservative Party Conference, the lead up to which has been
characterised by strong language from leader and UK Prime Minister David Cameron on the
UK’s relationship with the EU. Françoise Boucek argues that Cameron’s management of
dissent within his party, by seeking compromise and appeasing opponents, is based on
lessons learned from the Conservatives internal rows over Europe during the 1980 and 1990s.
Europe has long been a problem f or Britain’s Conservatives. David Cameron has learned
the lessons of  his predecessors and hopes his diplomatic skills will keep the peace in his
party, in his coalit ion government and in a changing Europe until at least the 2015 general election.
Cameron’s recent rhetoric on Europe ref lects growing Conservative unease over Europe prompted by rising
popularity f or the UK Independence Party (UKIP), strains in the coalit ion government and policy headaches
f rom renewed EU drives f or supranational governance.
Going into the Conservatives’ 2012 annual
conf erence, the talk has been about EU
budget f reezes, Brit ish opt-outs and opt- ins,
a potential ref erendum on EU membership and
a review of  the balance of  EU competences.
It ’s all reminiscent of  the Thatcher-Major
f actional wars over Europe analysed in my
f orthcoming book Factional Politics: How
Dominant Parties Implode or Stabilize
(Palgrave).
Last July, Foreign Secretary William Hague
launched the Review of  the Balance of
Competences in the EU described by J. Clive
Matthews on this blog as ‘a waste of  t ime’ due
to the impossibility of  conducting a proper
costs/benef its analysis. I attended the audit’s
init ial workshop a week bef ore the
Conservative conf erence and it looked like
this consultation exercise aims to def use
Conservative dissent while kicking the European issue into the long grass.
This workshop didn’t instil much f aith in the government’s commitment to the exercise and had all the
hallmarks of  an internal conversation. Participants were almost all EU stakeholders f rom the public sector
including representatives f rom EU member state embassies in London, consumer and environmental
groups, a handf ul of  academics and one or two f rom business organisations. Phillip Souta f rom Business
for New Europe joined the f our-member panel at the last minute. It certainly didn’t f eel like the launch of  a
constructive Europe-wide debate about ref orming the EU to enhance its democratic legit imacy and
reconnect with its cit izens as touted in the FCO’s Command Paper. Indeed, the FCO panellist lef t early and
gave evasive answers about the audit’s structure, reporting methods and measurements.
Eurosceptic Conservatives have been buoyed with the promise of  more ‘veto moments’ f rom Cameron like
last December when he threatened to block a f iscal pact to stabilise the eurozone. In reality, though, it
wasn’t a veto opportunity since no new EU-wide treaty was required and the UK isn’t a member of  the
eurozone anyway. Still, it  allowed Cameron to toss a scrap of  red meat to Conservative dissidents and a
largely eurosceptic populace and to exaggerate his capacity f or saying ‘no’. Af ter all, he had just suf f ered a
record post-war legislative rebellion when more than half  his caucus supported a motion calling f or a
ref erendum on the UK’s EU membership. Cameron’s use of  a heavy-handed three- line whip over a non-
binding vote was an unnecessary reminder of  Conservative divisions in John Major ’s years.
These days, the capacity f or any EU national government to veto EU policy is limited by treaty changes and
EU enlargement. It ’s also more dif f icult to mobilise support and build alliances in an EU of  27 member
states than just the nine or 12 f rom Western Europe during the Thatcher-Major years. Moreover, the
opportunit ies f or the UK to strike special deals in the European Council, like the 1984 budget rebate, or the
1992 opt-out of  the euro, have just about gone.
Cameron’s management of  intra-party dissent is complicated by the constraints of  coalit ion government,
where he has to strike a delicate balance with the pro-EU Liberal Democrats led by Nick Clegg, a f ormer
MEP. The current audit of  the EU’s existing competences was part of  the coalit ion government programme
agreed in 2010.
Cameron knows only too well the problems Europe causes f or Brit ish Conservatives and told them himself
upon becoming leader in 2005 that they had to ‘stop banging on about Europe’. In the 1980s, Thatcher
polarised party opinion with her strident anti-Europe views and made enemies of  f ormer Chancellors of  the
Exchequer Geof f rey Howe and Nigel Lawson, her once neo- liberal comrades in the battle of  ideas.
Thatcher ’s successor John Major headed a deeply divided party during the tricky negotiations of  the
Maastricht Treaty creating monetary union. Against the odds, he won a f ourth consecutive victory f or the
Conservatives in 1992 but with a reduced majority of  21 seats. This increased the leverage of  eurosceptic
MPs who demanded an EU ref erendum and their support was crit ical to the government’s survival as by-
election def eats piled up. Major ref used to compromise and threats of  EU deadlocks and votes of
conf idence in the government f ailed to discipline the rebels who were eventually disowned but later
readmitted. This mistrust and disunity contributed greatly to the Conservatives’ crushing loss to Tony
Blair ’s Labour in 1997.
Cameron thinks he’s learned f rom his predecessors and is comf ortable striking compromises and
appeasing opponents. Like Blair, he is adept at ref raming divisive issues to def use them. He recently stated
that he doesn’t think it is in Britain’s interest to leave the EU but quickly added that Brit ish voters would
have to give ‘f resh consent’ f or any change in the UK’s relationship with the EU. He is also changing the
context by f ocusing on the EU’s 2014-2020 budget negotiations and pushing f or a f reeze in EU spending in
coalit ion with natural allies in northern Europe.
Françoise Boucek’s book Factional Polit ics: How Dominant Parties Implode or Stabilize (Palgrave Macmillan)
is due out in November 2012.
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